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Migration from Mexico to the Unites States is one of the most formidable and com-
plex issues on the bilateral agenda today. Mexico now has more emigrants than any
other country in the world and over 95 percent of them have gone to the U.S. The
United States is the top immigrant-receiving country worldwide, and it hosts more
immigrants fromMexico (approximately 30 percent of the total of almost 40 million)
than from any other country. The U.S.-Mexican border is by far the world’s lead-
ing migration corridor. It has been estimated that from 1970 to 2006 the number
of persons born in Mexico who reside permanently in the U.S. rose 15-fold, to ap-
proximately 12 million. The average annual flow grew from about 220 000 per year
in the first half of 1980s to around 610 000 per year in this century.1 It should also
be pointed out that, in all likelihood, 85 percent or more of those who have enter-
ed the U.S. since 2000 are undocumented,2 which is now one of the main points
of controversy.
This migratory flow has been commonplace ever since Mexico was forced to cede
half its territory to the U.S. after losing the war in 1848. For many years thereafter,
movement between the two countries was entirely unregulated and was relatively
small-scale. In 1924, the United States began controlling and restricting entry for
the first time. During the 1930s, many Mexicans were deported from the U.S. —in-
cluding some persons who had been born there, of Mexican parents, and thus were,
in fact, U.S. citizens— as scapegoats for the massive unemployment and severe
economic hardships imposed by the “Great Depression.”
However World War II produced a shortage of male labor, and once again Mex-
ican workers were needed in the U.S. This renewed demand was filled through
what is commonly known as the bracero program, which lasted from 1942 to 1964.
Under this program, male workers were supplied mainly for agricultural employ-
ment and some railroad construction and maintenance on a temporary seasonal
basis. Many braceros established strong ties to their employers and some settled
permanently in the U.S., while others continued to go there to work on a season-
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al basis long after the bracero program itself ceased to exist. From that time on,
unauthorized migration grew steadily so that it had reached significant propor-
tions by the mid-1980s.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed in 1986 to regular-
ize undocumented workers who had been living and working in the U.S. for a consid-
erable period and supposedly stem future growth in unauthorized migration between
Mexico and the U.S. The end result, however, seems to have been just the opposite.
Large numbers of Mexicans (between 2 and 3 million) who achieved permanent res-
idency in the U.S. began requesting permission for their family members to join them.
Many whowere discouraged by the long waiting periods began to look for other means
to reunite their families north of the U.S.-Mexican border, thus providing a new impe-
tus for undocumented migration in the post-IRCA period.
At the same time economic conditions in both countries greatly facilitated —and in
fact propitiated— a significant increase in undocumented migration. While industrial
and economic restructuring in the U.S. eliminated many fairly well paying manufac-
turing jobs, employment opportunities for less skilled and lower paid service workers
began to rise, as the numbers of persons willing to accept these jobs declined. Further-
more, economic restructuring and modernization, as implemented in Mexico, creat-
ed a large supply of redundant labor. Many of Mexico’s unemployed, underemployed
or informally employed and underpaid workers sought to better their lot by migrat-
ing to the U.S. The significant wage differential makes jobs deemed undesirable by
many native born U.S. workers desirable enough to attract hundreds of thousands of
Mexicans who literally risk their lives to enter the U.S. to work each year.
Migration provides not only an escape valve for much of the labor that the Mexican
economy cannot absorb, but also generates foreign exchange and purchasing power
from the remittances these workers send back. The cheap, abundant supply of low-
skilled workers from Mexico keeps prices down for many domestically produced
goods and services in the U.S. and thus contributed significantly to economic growth
throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. However, nativist sentiments and xeno-
phobic attitudes have combined with fears of job loss and downward pressure on
wages to make immigration policy a highly controversial issue in the U.S. There seems
to be no easy way to resolve the contradiction of needingMexicanmigrants as a source
of cheap unskilled labor and yet not wanting them as residents.
Paradoxically, U.S. legislation and increased border surveillance, designed to keep
unauthorized immigrants out, have in effect worked toward an opposite end, keeping
those who do manage to enter the U.S. there for longer periods of time and increas-
ing their efforts to bring in family members as well. Thus, for many, the once circu-
latory patterns of going and coming betweenMexico and theU.S. on a regular basis have
given way to more permanent settlement. This has in turn exacerbated the xeno-
phobic and anti-immigrant sentiments prevalent among some segments of the U.S.
population. Since IRCA, the U.S. has consistently opposed any further facilitation of
freer transit and more permanence for workers from Mexico despite the evident de-
mand for such labor. Nevertheless Mexican immigration has continued to grow over
the past few decades contrary to the decline that was expected to result from the North
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and even though entering the U.S. has
become much more difficult since 9/11.
In this chapter we will discuss the characteristics of, andmost recent changes in, the
migratory process and highlight the factors determining its continued growth in recent
years. We will address the following issues: Why do so many Mexicans migrate to
the U.S.? How can the U.S. economy absorb so many migrants? What kinds of jobs
do they find and what are their earnings levels? What opportunities and obstacles do
the children of these migrants face in the U.S.? In discussing these issues, we will
also try to shed some light on how and why the immigration debate has become such
a controversial topic in the U.S. today and hence a conflictive item on the bilateral
agenda.
Why Do So Many Mexicans Migrate to the U.S.?
The flow of Mexicans entering the U.S. began to surpass European migration
during the 1980s. This sharp increase in Mexican migration was spurred by the
country’s profound economic crisis and the neoliberal economic policies imple-
mented at that time. Subsequently, in spite of the rhetoric and false hopes pinned
on NAFTA —both the Mexican and U.S. presidents maintained that the trade
agreement would significantly stem the growing migratory flow— migration from
Mexico grew even more during the 1990s. Increased border surveillance after 9/11
has not deterred migrants either; it has only prompted them to remain in the U.S.
for longer periods of time, often leading to more permanent settlement. Thus, in
recent years Mexico has been the main supplier of cheap unskilled labor for the
U.S. market. This is just the most recent twist in Mexico’s ongoing search for easy
solutions to the country’s unresolved economic problems. The Mexican economy
began facing difficulties in the 1970s, when the “stabilizing development model”
based on import substitution, credited with having produced 30 years of favorable
macroeconomic performance, became less and less effective in promoting eco-
nomic growth.
The oil boom in the late 1970s postponed the crisis for a while, but resulted in
over-indebtedness and instability. When international oil prices dropped back to their
more normal levels at the beginning of the 1980s, the flow of foreign exchange fell
and Mexico was about to default on its foreign debt payments. The payments were
finally renegotiated and an “adjustment program” was implemented, abruptly chang-
ing the course of economic policies.
ForMexico, as in the case of most of the other LatinAmerican countries, the 1980s
was considered a lost decade in terms of economic growth and well-being for the
majority of the population. Subsequent improvement during the Salinas administra-
tion (1989-1994) rested on very shaky foundations (volatile foreign capital flows,
attracted by high interest rates and manipulation of the exchange rate) as was evi-
denced by the peso crisis at the end of 1994. After a sharp drop (-6.2 percent) in GDP
in 1995, the economy grew at an average rate of just under 5.5 percent for the next
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five years. Real GDP did not grow at all in 2001 and remained stagnant until 2004.3
Growth rates from the mid-1990s on seem to indicate that macroeconomic behavior
in Mexico depends now, more than ever, on economic performance in the U.S.
Starting in 1999, employment growth in Mexico began to wane, and it was ne-
gative in 2004.4 Until the early 1960s, over half of the work force was still engaged
in agriculture, dominated by subsistence farming. However, agricultural employment
has declined significantly since then and currently stands at around 15 percent.
Between 1997 and 2006, almost three million workers were forced out of agricul-
tural employment.5 Some of these eventually found precarious low-paying jobs in
services or construction, while many others opted for migration to the U.S.
Employment growth in construction and services contrasts with the loss of
almost 700 000 manufacturing jobs between 2000 and 2006. Moreover, less than
one-fifth (18 percent) of manufacturing workers are employed by the large firms
that produce 80 percent of the sector’s value added. A slightly smaller percentage
work in maquiladora plants, which still have not recovered the 2000 employment
levels of 1291000 jobs. Almost half of all jobs (48.4 percent in mid-2006) are pro-
vided by micro-businesses, with up to only 15 employees in manufacturing or five
or fewer in trade and services. Less than one-quarter of the economically active pop-
ulation (EAP) works in medium-sized or large firms.6 Almost half (approximately 48
percent) of all wage earners have no written contracts. While 20 percent of those
employed reported working fewer than 35 hours a week, 27 percent reported aver-
aging more than 48 hours. Around 40 percent of all workers have no benefits. Only
32 percent are registered in the national social security system (IMSS), with an addi-
tional 5.7 percent covered by social security for government employees (ISSSTE).7
The official “open unemployment” rate, which was 4.4 percent in mid-2006,
clearly underestimates the existing job deficit, and is also an attempt to hide the fact
that more than half of the persons counted as employed only work sporadically
and/or, in fact, work in the informal sector of the economy. According to Sandra
Polaski, informal employment grew during the first half of the 1990s, reaching ap-
proximately 50 percent, and although it has declined somewhat, it still stands at
around 46 percent.8 However an International Labor Organization (ILO) report re-
leased in 2004 maintained that over the past few years, informal employment in
Mexico had risen from 55 to 62 percent.9
88 ELAINE LEVINE
3 Presidencia de la República, Sexto Informe de Gobierno, Anexo Estadístico (Mexico City: Presidencia
de la República, September 1, 2006).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Sandra Polaski, “Perspectivas on the Future of NAFTA: Mexican Labor in North American Integration”
(paper, colloquium “El Impacto del TLCAN en México a los 10 años,” Universidad Nacional Autóno-
ma de México, Mexico City, June 29-30, 2004), 17.
9 “En la economía informal, 62% de los empleos de México: OIT,” La Jornada, June 12, 2004, 33.
It is frequently said that Mexico needs to create one million new jobs per year
just to maintain current employment levels. This is slightly below the annual aver-
age of 1144 000 new jobs created between 1991 and 1999, according to official fi-
gures. Between 2000 and 2006 the average was only 406000 new jobs per year.10
The deficit of approximately 600000 a year coincides rather closely with Jeffrey Passel’s
estimate of about 610 000 Mexicans migrating to the U.S. every year since 2000.11
It is also frequently argued that it is not so much the outright lack of jobs that
is driving increased migration, but rather the lack of adequately paying jobs, or in
other words, the wage differential between Mexico and the U.S.12 In addition to
underemployment, disguised unemployment or informal employment, the Mexican
work force has also had to withstand steadily declining real wages, which have been
eroding individual and family incomes over the past 25 years. The main objective of
the price controls imposed after the 1982 crisis was to keep wages from rising.
Official data reveals that between 1982 and 2002 nominal wages increased by 150.5
percent, while prices rose 618 percent. The net effect was a 75 percent decline in
purchasing power.13 Until the end of May 2007, the federal minimum wage in the
U.S. was US$5.15 per hour, or approximately ten times more than the Mexican
minimum wage at that time, depending on the exchange rate. Twenty-two percent
of workers in Mexico earn the minimum wage or less; almost two-thirds earn up
to three times the minimum, and 83 percent earn up to five times the minimum,
which turns out to be less that half of the current U.S. minimum wage.14
The low wages and precarious working conditions so prevalent in Mexico often
make migration to the U.S. appear as the only viable alternative. Every state in the
country now has some level of international migration. Although most still come
from the traditional sending states in the western central region, states in Central,
Southern and Southeastern Mexico show high growth rates in the number of
recent migrants. Increased female migration is another new trend, along with the
extraordinary growth of remittances. The amount sent back to family members in
Mexico rose by more than 600 percent between 1995 and 2006. It is estimated
that approximately five percent of all Mexican households receive remittances,
which represent about 36 percent of their total income.15 The Mexican Central
Bank (Banco deMéxico) recognized that, as of 2003, remittances became the coun-
try’s second source of foreign exchange, after oil exports, and that they were vitally
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important in bolstering consumer spending during the economically stagnant years
from 2001 to 2003.16
Some years ago the Mexican government was accused of indifference toward
those who left the country to seek work in the U.S. Needless to say, the government
has no interest in preventing this north-bound flow. The main concern now seems
to be how to make sure that those who go continue to send money to their families
back home. Recently, in fact, there have been efforts to strengthen migrants’ ties to
their homeland. Dual nationality was approved, and hometown associations are
actively promoted and supported. Mexican consulates now provide a form of iden-
tification (the matricula consular, or consular registration) for all who request it. Those
living abroad now have the right to vote in Mexican presidential elections. All of
these measures help keep those who leave connected in some way to their places
of origin. However, in spite of all the adverse conditions in the Mexican labor market
and the fact that so many people have friends and relatives living in the U.S., there
would not be so many migrants today if there were no opportunities for employment
once they cross the border.
How Can the U.S. Economy Absorb So Many Migrants?
Just as remittances have become more and more important for the Mexican econ-
omy, immigrant labor has becomemore andmore important in the U.S.Andrew Sum
and his co-authors maintain that the record number of 14 million immigrants arriving
in the U.S. between 1990 and 2000 was decisive for filling old and new jobs dur-
ing the extraordinary period of uninterrupted economic growth from 1991 to 2001.17
Many people, including George W. Bush andAlan Greenspan, have recognized how
important immigrant labor is for the economy today, while others insist that it has
been negative for native-born workers.18 The foreign-born, almost a third of whom
are from Mexico, currently make up 15 percent of the work force. Undoubtedly their
presence has facilitated certain changes in the U.S. economy, in particular shifts in
the employment structure.
In absolute terms, the U.S. work force increased by 140 percent from 1950 to
2005, whereas, relatively, it only grew from 59.2 to 66 percent of the total working-
age population.19 However, important economic and social transformations (the
scientific and technological revolution, particularly the revolution in information
90 ELAINE LEVINE
16 R. González Amador, “Las remesas de EU mantienen el consumo interno en México”, La Jornada,
February 4, 2003, 20.
17Andrew Sum, Neeta Fogg, Paul Harrington, et al., “Immigrant Workers and the Great American Job
Machine: The Contributions of New Foreign Immigration to National and Regional Labor Force Growth
in the 1990s” (paper, National Business Roundtable, Washington, D. C., August, 2002), 2.
18 See S. A. Camarota, “A Jobless Recovery? Immigrant Gains and Native Losses,” Backgrounder,
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, October, 2004).
19 U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings, vol. 53, no. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, January, 2006), 203.
technology; the growth of transnational corporations; the civil rights movement;
the feminist movement; globalization; increased access to higher education; eco-
nomic and industrial restructuring; and neoliberal economic policies, to mention
just a few) have significantly changed the characteristics and sectoral distribution
of the work force over time.
First of all, employment in agriculture dropped severely in both absolute and re-
lative terms. In 1940, 20 percent of the EAP, or 9.5 million persons, were employed
in agriculture compared to 2.2 million, barely 1.6 percent of the EAP, in 2005.
Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to be one of the world’s leading producers and
exporters of agricultural goods. Overall, the proportion of workers involved in pro-
ducing goods declined from 37.9 percent of the EAP in 1955 to 15.8 percent in
2005, in contrast to the rise of those producing or providing services, which grew
from 62.1 percent of the EAP to 83.4 percent.20 Furthermore, thanks in part to the
growing trade deficit, the range of goods and services available to U.S. consumers
is broader than ever.
In spite of the relative decline in manufacturing employment, the absolute num-
ber of jobs in this sector grew until 1979 when it reached 19.4 million. Since then,
over 5 million jobs have been lost in manufacturing, which went from employing 30.6
percent of the work force in 1955, to 21.6 percent in 1979 and just 10.7 percent
in 2005.21 The decline was particularly sharp from 2000 to 2005 when over 3 mil-
lion manufacturing jobs disappeared, over a third of them in the seven-state Great
Lakes region. Most of the workers laid off were men without college degrees who
will have a difficult time finding another position that offers similar income levels
and benefits. Therefore, many of them have simply dropped out of the work force.22
Male work force participation rate has declined slowly but surely since the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, from 86.4 percent in 1950 to 73.3 percent in 2005.23
Even the number of prime-working-age men (those between 30 and 55) who are
not in the work force has risen and now stands at around 13 percent.24 Female par-
ticipation, on the other hand, has increased steadily (from 33.9 percent in 1950 to
59.3 percent in 2005), to such an extent than women now constitute 46.4 percent
of the EAP. Female participation in the work force rose most heavily during the
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1970s and 1980s. Probably catalyzed first by the feminist movement, the later rise
came as a response to greater labor market insecurity and instability in family incomes
due to industrial restructuring and neoliberal economic policies. The increase in
service-sector jobs also facilitated greater female work force participation.
However, the U.S. work force grew by only 11.5 percent in the 1990s, and it
has been calculated that without newly arrived immigrants it would have increas-
ed by only 5 percent.25 There is general consensus that new immigrants were vital
for employment growth as well as economic growth in general.26 Unfortunately, both
women and lower skilled immigrants tend to be paid less than white non-Hispanic
males for similar work; hence, their increased labor force participation is also asso-
ciated with the decline in average wages observable since 1973. Growing polar-
ization, in terms of both types of jobs and earnings levels, has characterized the U.S.
labor market in recent decades. Job growth has been heaviest at both the high and
the low ends of the skills and earnings spectrum. Mexican migrants, most of whom
have low levels of educational attainment, are absorbed and concentrated in low-
skilled, low-paying jobs.
What Kinds of Jobs Do They Find and
What Are Their Earnings Levels?
For most Mexican migrants who come to the U.S., their primary motivation is to
work and earn dollars. It is not surprising, then, that the Mexican-origin popula-
tion27 has the highest work-force participation rate in the country: 68.4 percent in
2005.28 The male rate of 81.8 percent significantly exceeds that of any other
group. Although the female rate (53.6 percent) is slightly lower than for some other
population groups, it is much higher than women’s participation in the EAP in Mex-
ico, which is around 38 percent. Unemployment rates for those of Mexican origin
mirror the ups and downs of economic activity as do unemployment rates in general.
For the past three decades or more, unemployment rates for Mexicans and for
Latinos in general in the U.S. have consistently been lower than the rates for African
Americans but higher than those of the non-Hispanic white population.
It is not unusual for low-skilled recent immigrants to have the least desirable
and lowest-paying jobs, which nevertheless provide incomes much higher than
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they could earn in their countries of origin. Such has been the experience of the
vast majority of Mexican migrants to the U.S. since they have relatively few years
of schooling and little or no knowledge of English upon arrival. However, certain
disadvantages in terms of educational attainment persist even for the second and
third generations and affect labor market outcomes for many who were born in
the U.S.
Department of Labor statistics indicate that the Mexican-origin work force is
more or less evenly distributed among four of the five major occupational cate-
gories: 24.1 percent in services; 22 percent in natural resources, construction and
maintenance occupations; 19.7 percent in production, transportation and materi-
al moving; and 20 percent in sales and office occupations. Only 14.2 percent are
employed in the fifth major category of managerial or professional positions, which
is much lower than 34.7 percent for the entire work force and lower than any other
racial or ethnic group. Only 3.1 percent of all Mexican workers are employed in the
sub-category of farming, fishing or forestry; nonetheless, the percentage employed
in these activities, where wages tend to be extremely low, is much higher than that
of any other group.29
Significant numbers of Mexicans are employed in manufacturing and construc-
tion (11.2 percent and 15.9 percent, respectively), where there are some well-paying
positions for highly skilled, experienced workers. However, most hold low-paying,
low-skilled jobs. Just over 11 percent have office and administrative support posi-
tions, but many of these are female-dominated occupations where salaries tend
to be low. The same holds true for most of the sales jobs that provide employment
for 8.7 percent of Mexican workers. Another 9.1 and 8.8 percent, respectively, work
preparing and serving food and cleaning and maintaining buildings and grounds,
and their wages are very low. Within each of the general occupational categories or
sub-categories, Mexicans and other Latinos tend to be concentrated or constitute
a relatively high proportion of all workers in certain specific occupations: certain
branches of light rather than heavy manufacturing; cleaning and maintenance
services for buildings and grounds; food preparation and handling; cashiers in
self-service stores and retail sales; and certain types of construction work, to men-
tion a few.
Data for employment by industry reveals that some branches have come to
depend more and more on Latino workers, almost two-thirds of whom are Mexican
(see table 1).30 Between 1990 and 2005 the proportion of Latinos in the work force
grew from 7.5 to 13.1 percent. At the same time in the animal slaughtering and pro-
cessing industry it rose from 17 to 39.3 percent. In construction, it increased from
8.5 to 23 percent. In some branches (landscaping services, cutting and sewing ap-
parel, private household service) where Latino participation was already high, the
growth is less spectacular. Latino participation in food manufacturing grew from
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14.1 to 27.7 percent and was even more pronounced in certain sub-sectors. Carpet
and rug mills showed the sharpest rise: in just 15 years the percentage of Latino
workers grew from 10.1 to 31.6 percent. Dalton, Georgia is the carpet capital of the
United States, and Latinos are now around 40 percent of the town’s total population.
Occupational and industrial concentration among Latino workers is intertwined
with their geographical concentration. Approximately three-fourths of all Latinos
live in just seven states. However, in some states in the South, the Midwest and the
West, the Latino population —still quite small numerically— grew from more
than 200 to almost 400 percent between 1990 and 2000, because of employment
opportunities.31 Often Mexicans and others are actively recruited to fill jobs in
meat packing or poultry processing plants, or carpet and rug mills, that local work-
ers now disdain. The same holds true for agricultural work in many parts of the
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TABLE 1
INDUSTRIES WITH HIGH CONCENTRATION OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Industry % Latino % Latino Increase in
1990 2005 % Latinos
1990-2005
Total 7.5 13.1 74.7
Animal slaughtering and processing 17.0 39.3 131.2
Landscaping services* 25.2 37.5 48.8
Cut and sew apparel 22.6 35.8 58.4
Car washes* 22.5 35.4 57.3
Private households 17.6 33.9 92.6
Fruit and vegetable preserving and specialty foods 21.0 32.8 56.2
Services to buildings and dwellings 18.0 32.3 79.4
Carpet and rug mills 10.1 31.6 212.9
Crop production 19.5 29.1 49.2
Support activities for agriculture and forestry 15.4 27.9 81.2
Food manufacturing 14.1 27.7 96.5
Bakeries, except retail* 13.0 27.3 110.0
Warehousing and storage 13.8 24.7 79.0
Dry cleaning and laundry services 14.6 24.5 67.8
Retail bakeries 14.4 24.4 69.4
Textiles, apparel and leather 20.2 24.4 20.8
Specialty food stores* 13.1 24.4 86.3
Traveler accomodation 15.2 23.7 55.9
Soap, cleaning compounds and cosmetics 14.5 23.6 62.8
Construction 8.5 23.0 170.6
* There is no data for these industries in 1990; the figures shown in the first column are for 1994 and
the change is with repect to that year.
Source: Author's calculations with data from Employment and Earnings (January 2006), 234-238.
Southeast or states like California, Texas and Oregon. The demand for workers to
carry out undesirable low-paying jobs rose significantly at the end of the twentieth
century, and coincided with the arrival of new waves of immigrants from Mexico
and other Latin American countries, who were more than willing to take such jobs.
Most of the occupations with large numbers of Latinos are low-skilled, low-wage
jobs requiring no more than a high school education (see table 2). In occupations with
over a 100 000 Latino workers where median weekly earnings are above the overall
median, the percentage of Latinos, with respect to the total number employed, tends
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TABLE 2
OCCUPATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBERS OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Occupations # Latino % Latino Median
Weekly
Earnings
Total 16 Years and Over 18,566,630 13.1 $651
Construction laborers 608,328 40.8 $502
Janitors and building cleaners 566,202 27.3 $408
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 559,076 16.4 $624
Cooks 538,534 29.3 $336
Cashiers 498,150 16.2 $336
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 486,464 35.2 $335
Grounds maintenance workers 443,938 37.4 $389
Carpenters 438,468 24.4 $556
Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 393,328 40.3 $372
Retail salespersons 383,264 11.8 $494
Laborers and freight, stock, and
material movers, hand 353,976 19.6 $456
First-line supervisors/managers of retail
sales workers 317,070 9.0 $631
Secretaries and administrative assistants 300,914 8.6 $562
Waiters and waitresses 294,831 15.3 $352
Nursing, psychiatric and home health aides 285,000 15.0 $388
Stock clerks and order fillers 248,370 17.0 $427
Painters, construction and maintenance 241,150 35.0 $466
Child care workers 240,549 18.1 $332
Customer service representatives 240,123 13.1 $524
Packers and packagers, hand 188,032 41.6 $372
Automotive service technicians and mechanics 168,858 17.7 $629
Receptionists and information clerks 167,872 12.2 $466
Food preparation workers 162,016 24.4 $321
Elementary and middle school teachers 154,344 5.9 $826
First-line supervisors/managers of office and
administrative support 143,820 9.0 $686
First-line supervisors/managers of non-retail
sales workers 138,572 9.8 $881
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Employment and Earnings (January 2006).
to be low. For all occupations with high concentrations —or in other words the
highest percentages— of Latinos (see table 3), median weekly earnings were below
the overall median of US$651 in 2005.32 Latino workers are affected by the dis-
appearance of internal job ladders in many industries, on one hand, and, on the
other, by social networks for recruiting that channel them into certain types of jobs.33
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33 See Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: The New Press, 1998); and Roger
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Press, 2003).
TABLE 3
OCCUPATIONS WITH THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGES OF LATINO WORKERS (2005)
Occupations # Latino Median % Latino
Weekly
Earnings
Total 16 Years and Over 13.1 $651 18,566,630
Cement masons, concrete finishers and terrazzo workers 54.4 $519 64,736
Drywall installers, ceiling tile installers and tapers 46.8 $511 117,936
Roofers 42.0 $500 115,080
Butchers and other meat, poultry and fish 
processing workers 42.0 $444 122,640
Packers and packagers, hand 41.6 $372 188,032
Construction laborers 40.8 $502 608,328
Graders and sorters, agricultural products 40.5 $402 27,945
Farming, fishing and forestry occupations 40.3 $372 393,328
Carpet, floor and tile installers and finishers 40.0 $482 118,800
Helpers, construction trades 38.6 $437 43,618
Helpers, production workers 37.8 n.d. 21,924
Packaging and filing machine operators and tenders 37.6 $410 113,928
Grounds maintenance workers 37.4 $389 443,938
Pressers, textile, garment and related materials 35.7 n.d. 24,990
Dishwashers 35.4 $296 93,456
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 35.2 $335 486,464
Painters, construction and maintenance 35.0 $466 241,150
Brickmasons, blockmasons and stonemasons 33.7 $598 82,565
Sewing machine operators 33.6 $360 90,384
Cleaners of vehicles and equipment 33.5 $385 116,245
Dining room and cafeteria attendants and 
bartender helpers 30.4 $347 113,392
Laundry and dry-cleaning workers 29.4 $372 52,332
Cooks 29.3 $336 538,534
Cutting workers 28.6 $496 28,600
Pest control workers 27.8 $508 19,182
Janitors and building cleaners 27.3 $408 566,202
Source: Author's calculations based on data in Employment and Earnings (January 2006).
Undocumented immigrants are all the more vulnerable because of their irregu-
lar status. Furthermore, their numbers have grown markedly over the past few years.
According to Jeffrey Passel’s estimations approximately half of all Mexicans living
in the United States today are undocumented, as are 85 percent of those who have
entered since 2000.34 In general, however, employment is precarious for the lowest-
skilled Latinos because of changes implemented in response to increased interna-
tional competition, which have made the labor market increasingly more segmented
and stratified.     
Many new “labor market niches for immigrants” have grown along with the seem -
ingly endless supply of newcomers. Most of them can earn up to 10 or even 15 times
more than in their countries of origin. Nevertheless they are relegated to the lowest
socioeconomic strata in the United States. Even though Latino workers make up
a growing proportion of the work force, they continue to experience high poverty
rates, high unemployment rates and low incomes.35 Relative wages have noticeably
declined in almost all the occupations that now have high concentrations of Latino
workers (see table 4). The drop is particularly noticeable in some of the specialized
construction trades, where median weekly earnings were higher than the general
median in 1990, and by 2005 they were considerably lower.36 Thus over the past
20 years, Latino workers have generally experienced wage decline with respect to
other population groups in the United States.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, in the case of women, and the early 1990s, for
men, Latinos have had lower median incomes than the rest of the population. La -
ti no men’s median income is slightly lower than Afro-Americans’, and there is a sub-
stantial gap between these two groups and non-Hispanic whites. For men who work
full time year round, Latinos’ median income has been lower than Afro-Americans’
since the mid-1980s, and the gap is growing, as is the much larger gap between La -
tinos and non-Hispanic whites (see graph 1). 
Latina women’s median income is considerably lower than that of AfricanAmerican
women, who actually have incomes somewhat closer to non-Hispanic white women’s.
In the case of women who work year-round full time (see graph 2), Latina’s median
income has consistently been the lowest of all, since it began being registered, and
the difference is growing.37 Among all Latino workers, Mexican males and females
have the lowest median incomes.38
Even though Latino families and households’ median incomes are slightly high-
er than AfricanAmericans’, the gap between both of these groups and non-Hispanic
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34 Passel, “How many Mexicans?”
35 Thomas-Breitfeld, “The Latino Workforce,” Statistical Brief no. 3. Washington, D.C.: National Council
of La Raza, 2003.
36 U.S. Department of Labor, January 1991, 196-199, 223-227; and January, 2006, 218-223, 258-262.
37 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 2004,
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/ASEC2004/2004CPS; accessed February 2, 2006.
38 For a more detailed analysis of Latinos’ occupations and earnings in the United States, see Elaine
Levine, Los nuevos pobres de Estados Unidos: los hispanos (Mexico City: UNAM and Miguel Ángel
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white families and households tends to grow. Furthermore, Latino families and
households appear to do better than African American ones not because of indi-
vidual earnings —which as we have just seen tend to be lower than those of African
American men and women, respectively— but because there are more persons
employed per family or household. At the same time, however, there are usually
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also more dependents. Latino households often include members of the extend-
ed family (uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.), and even individuals who are not family mem-
bers but perhaps come from the same hometown. The net effect is that the higher
incomes have to meet the needs of a larger number of persons; thus, from 1985 on,
Latinos’ per capita income has been lower than African Americans’. In 2003, the dif-
ference was just over US$2,000 per year (US$13,492 and US$15,583, respec tively),
and non-Hispanic whites’ per capita income was almost double (US$26,774).39
While the poverty rate for African Americans has been cut in half since 1959,
the rate for Latinos has not improved overall, beyond that observed in the early
1970s, when such data was first registered. In general, Latino poverty rose between
1972 and 1994 (from 22.8 percent in 1972 to 30.7 percent in 1994), and then return -
ed to prior levels as a result of the economic expansion thereafter (see graph 3).
African Americans, who comprised 31.1 percent of those living below the poverty
threshold in 1966, were only 25.4 percent in 2004, whereas Latinos, who were 10.3
percent of those living in poverty in 1972, comprised 24.7 percent by 2004 (see
graph 4).40 In other words, a little more that one-eighth of the total population is
Latino but Latinos now constitute almost one fourth of all those with incomes
below the poverty line. If these tendencies continue, Latinos will not only be the largest
ethnic or racial minority —as the 2000 census classifies them— they may also soon
become the most impoverished. Moreover, the proportion of recently arrived Mex -
icans and Latinos living in poverty definitely exceeds the overall rates. 
Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Current Population Survey, Historical
Poverty Tables.
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What Opportunities and Obstacles 
Do the Children of Mexican Immigrants Face?
The differences observed in incomes and socioeconomic status can be partially
explained by differences in years of schooling, particularly in recent decades, given
the high correlation between earnings and educational attainment observable in the
United States. Despite this connection, however, dropping out of high school is still
fairly prevalent among Latinos. Access to higher education is still quite limited for
most Latino youth, consequently limiting their employment options and also the
perspectives for intergenerational socioeconomic mobility. As shown is graphs 5 and
6, Mexicans lag furthest behind in terms of educational attainment in the United
States.
The high percentage of Mexicans who have not finished high school, or its equiv-
alent in Mexico, is largely due to the fact that compulsory education there only
includes nine years of schooling. In fact, many small villages only have elementary
schools. Upon finishing the ninth grade, or secundaria in Mexico, many families
consider that their children’s formal education has concluded, and they are ready to
go to work. At that time, young people from regions with high migratory rates may
choose to set out on their first journey north. This helps explain, to some extent,
why educational attainment for Mexicans in the U.S. is so low. 
Something not so easily explainable, however, is the great disparity in income
levels for persons with similar levels of educational attainment. At all levels, the aver-
age incomes of white males are considerably higher that those of African American
males or females, Latino males or females and white females. The differences grow
as educational attainment rises, and can only be attributed to persistent, racial,
ethnic and gender discrimination in the U.S. labor market (see graph 7).
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Despite these clear income differentials, Roberto Suro maintains that “In the
United States today the most impenetrable barriers to economic mobility are not
to be found in the labor markets, but in the nation’s public school systems.”41 A
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Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Statistical Abstract of the
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Source: Constructed by the author with data from the Statistical Abstract of the
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41 Roberto Suro, Strangers Among Us, Latino Lives in a Changing America (New York: Vintage Books,
1999), 314.
little further on, he adds, “The segregation of winners and losers in American soci-
ety still bears a high correlation to race and ethnicity but most of the segregating
takes place before people look for their first job,”42 in other words, while they are
still in school, or when they drop out of school. As we have already mentioned,
educational attainment is one of the most important determinants of income. A
large portion of the Mexican population in the U.S. has not completed high school
(or its equivalent in Mexico). Referring to the vicious circle metaphor seems unavoid -
able. Low family incomes and parents with little schooling are among the factors
most often associated with poor performance in school and high probabilities of
dropping out. 
In general, in the United States today, rich children and poor children do not
usually attend the same schools. Most AfricanAmerican and Latino children attend
schools where racial and ethnic minorities predominate and the preparation they
receive may be quite different from that offered to their non-Hispanic white and
Asian peers, who attend other schools in other neighborhoods. Commemoration
(in 2004) of the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court decision banning racial
segregation in public schools was dampened by persistent de facto segregation.
Since school assignment is determined by place of residence, schools in many
cities throughout the country are, in fact, even more segregated than they were
50 years ago. Furthermore, the inequality in funding between rich school districts
and poor ones is growing. “By relying on local property taxes as a crucial source of
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42 Ibid.
funds, the U.S. has created a caste system of public education that is increasing-
ly separate and unequal.”43
Moreover, segregation occurs not only between schools but also within schools.
In any given school students may be grouped in ways that in effect result in sep-
arating Afro-Americans and Latinos from non-Hispanic whites and others. New
means are constantly being devised that differentiate the educational experiences
and outcomes for poor minority children from those of their middle- and upper-class
counterparts.44 Funding, infrastructure, and even teaching practices, goals and content
differ to such an extent that the aims and objectives of the teaching-learning process
end up being not at all similar. Thus, the dreams and aspirations, the opportunities
and options for poor Latino immigrant children are limited almost as soon as they
enter school in the United Status. The public school system is, by and large, prepar-
ing them for the same kinds of low-skilled, low-paying jobs their parents have.
Final Considerations
Latino participation in the U.S. work force is expected to grow significantly over
the next few years and reach 17 percent by 2014.45 Labor Department projections
indicate that the number of low-skilled, low-wage, service sector jobs will also rise
considerably. Given the country’s changing demographic profile —an aging popu-
lation with low birth rates— and the low cost of unskilled Mexican labor, new
immigrants will still be finding employment opportunities in the U.S. for years to
come. Even though birth rates have recently declined somewhat in Mexico, pre-
vailing economic policies will probably assure a ready supply of emigrants for some
time yet. Thus, the demand for, and supply of, Mexican immigrant labor in the U.S.
will surely continue well into the next decade.
For more than 10 years now the U.S. has been unsuccessfully grappling with the
need for immigration reform. Nevertheless, and in spite of Mexican former President
(2000-2006) Vicente Fox’s repeated references to the possibilities for an “immigra-
tion agreement” between the two countries, there is no indication that the U.S. is
willing to consider anything other than unilateral action on this issue. However,
thus far, any action whatsoever has been elusive. Many proposals for immigra-
tion reform have been introduced into Congress over the past several years, but
few of them have gotten as far as to have actually been voted on. Senators Edward
Kennedy (Democrat) and John McCain (Republican) have been the most persist-
ent proponents of such legislation, but even these bipartisan attempts, of which there
have been several successive versions, have all failed. 
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45 U.S. Department of Labor, “Tomorrow’s Jobs,” Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2006, 7th ed. (Washington,
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In January 2004, President Bush launched his own proposal for a new and enhanc -
 ed Temporary Worker Program. In December 2005, the House of Represen tatives
passed the highly controversial and highly punitive proposal sponsored by Repre -
sen tative James Sensenbrenner, which after 239 votes for and only 182 against, became
known as H.R. 4437. This sparked massive protests by Latinos and many others through-
out the country in the spring of 2006. Different and considerably more flexible leg-
islation was subsequently approved by the Senate at the end of May, but it was
obviously not possible to reconcile the sharp differences between the two. Toward
the end of 2007, it became clear that any action on immigration reform will have
to wait until after the 2008 presidential elections.  
Since there has been no federal action in this area, many states have passed
their own laws, most of which are restrictive measures with an anti-immigrant bias.
Fe de ral officials have staged selective raids at some worksites, and many undocu-
mented workers have been deported. The climate of fear that prevails in many
localities nationwide now contrasts sharply with the exuberance of the 2006
marches and demonstrations.
Oddly enough, the Republican front runner at this time, and presidential candi-
date, John McCain, and the two Democratic contenders, Barack Obama and Hillary
Clinton, have voiced similar views on the need to regularize the status of the approx -
imately 12 million currently undocumented immigrants in the U.S., over half of whom
are presumably Mexican. All three voted “yes” on the Comprehensive Immigration
Reform Act approved by the Senate in 2006, but also voted “yes” to the Secure
Fence Act creating 700 miles of new fence along the U.S.-Mexico border. They all
favor granting in-state college tuition and even some sort of path to residency or
citizenship, for undocumented youth brought into the country by their parents when
they were younger. Obama and Clinton voted “no” on explicitly declaring English as
the national language, whereas McCain voted “yes.”
However, their apparent agreement on wanting to provide undocumented work-
ers with an opportunity to earn legal status is by no means a guarantee that legisla-
tion to that effect will be approved by the new Congress after the elections. Many
legislators are virulently opposed to granting what they consider to be “amnesty” to
those who, they argue, “have not played by the rules.” Most of these same law-mak-
ers —and many people in general— are not nearly as interested in punishing and
sanctioning employers who hire undocumented workers as they are in taking action
against the workers themselves. 
The entire question of immigration reform with all of its ramifications and relat -
ed issues is a highly controversial subject throughout the U.S. Despite the fact that
almost everyone agrees that the existing system has broken down and needs to be
fixed, it is not at all clear that there will be enough consensus on any of the ques-
tions involved to be able to pass new laws in the near future. What is clear is that,
in the minds of most, immigration is now strongly linked to national security and
hence not an issue open to bilateral discussion. In fact, immigration has always
been dealt with in the U.S. as a unilateral rather than a bilateral or multilateral
issue.  
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